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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 93-1841
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ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC., PETITIONER v.
FEDERICO PENA, SECRETARY OF
 TRANSPORTATION, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the tenth circuit
[June 12, 1995]

  Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion with respect to Parts I,
II, III-A, III-B, III-D, and IV, which is for the Court
except insofar as it might be inconsistent with the views
expressed in Justice Scalia's concurrence, and an
opinion with respect to Part III-C in which Justice
Kennedy joins.
  Petitioner Adarand Constructors, Inc., claims that the
Federal Government's practice of giving general contrac-
tors on government projects a financial incentive to hire
subcontractors controlled by -socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals,- and in particular, the
Government's use of race-based presumptions in identify-
ing such individuals, violates the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.  The Court of Appeals rejected Adarand's claim.
We conclude, however, that courts should analyze cases
of this kind under a different standard of review than
the one the Court of Appeals applied.  We therefore
vacate the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings.

                            I
  In 1989, the Central Federal Lands Highway Division
(CFLHD), which is part of the United States Department
of Transportation (DOT), awarded the prime contract for
a highway construction project in Colorado to Mountain
Gravel & Construction Company.  Mountain Gravel then
solicited bids from subcontractors for the guardrail
portion of the contract.  Adarand, a Colorado-based
highway construction company specializing in guardrail
work, submitted the low bid.  Gonzales Construction
Company also submitted a bid.
  The prime contract's terms provide that Mountain
Gravel would receive additional compensation if it hired
subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by
-socially and economically disadvantaged individuals,-
App. 24.  Gonzales is certified as such a business;
Adarand is not.  Mountain Gravel awarded the subcon-
tract to Gonzales, despite Adarand's low bid, and
Mountain Gravel's Chief Estimator has submitted an
affidavit stating that Mountain Gravel would have
accepted Adarand's bid, had it not been for the additional
payment it received by hiring Gonzales instead.  Id.,
at 28-31.  Federal law requires that a subcontracting
clause similar to the one used here must appear in most
federal agency contracts, and it also requires the clause
to state that -[t]he contractor shall presume that socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals include
Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities, or any
other individual found to be disadvantaged by the [Small
Business] Administration pursuant to section 8(a) of the
Small Business Act.-  15 U. S. C. 637(d)(2), (3).
Adarand claims that the presumption set forth in that
statute discriminates on the basis of race in violation of
the Federal Government's Fifth Amendment obligation
not to deny anyone equal protection of the laws.
  These fairly straightforward facts implicate a complex
scheme of federal statutes and regulations, to which we
now turn.  The Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. 631 et seq. (Act), declares it to be
-the policy of the United States that small business
concerns, [and] small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals, . . . shall have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate in the performance of con-
tracts let by any Federal agency.-  8(d)(1), 15 U. S. C.
637(d)(1).  The Act defines -socially disadvantaged
individuals- as -those who have been subjected to racial
or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their
identity as a member of a group without regard to their
individual qualities,- 8(a)(5), 15 U. S. C. 637(a)(5), and
it defines -economically disadvantaged individuals- as
-those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability
to compete in the free enterprise system has been
impaired due to diminished capital and credit opportuni-
ties as compared to others in the same business area
who are not socially disadvantaged.-  8(a)(6)(A), 15
U. S. C. 637(a)(6)(A).
  In furtherance of the policy stated in 8(d)(1), the Act
establishes -[t]he Government-wide goal for participation
by small business concerns owned and controlled by
socially and economically disadvantaged individuals- at
-not less than 5 percent of the total value of all prime
contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year.-
15 U. S. C. 644(g)(1).  It also requires the head of each
Federal agency to set agency-specific goals for participa-
tion by businesses controlled by socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individuals.  Ibid.
  The Small Business Administration (SBA) has imple-
mented these statutory directives in a variety of ways,
two of which are relevant here.  One is the -8(a)
program,- which is available to small businesses con-
trolled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals as the SBA has defined those terms.  The
8(a) program confers a wide range of benefits on
participating businesses, see, e. g., 13 CFR
124.303-124.311, 124.403 (1994); 48 CFR subpt. 19.8
(1994), one of which is automatic eligibility for subcon-
tractor compensation provisions of the kind at issue in
this case, 15 U. S. C. 637(d)(3)(C) (conferring presump-
tive eligibility on anyone -found to be disadvantaged . . .
pursuant to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act-).  To
participate in the 8(a) program, a business must be
-small,- as defined in 13 CFR 124.102 (1994); and it
must be 51% owned by individuals who qualify as
-socially and economically disadvantaged,- 124.103.
The SBA presumes that Black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific,
Subcontinent Asian, and Native Americans, as well as
-members of other groups designated from time to time
by SBA,- are -socially disadvantaged,- 124.105(b)(1).  It
also allows any individual not a member of a listed
group to prove social disadvantage -on the basis of clear
and convincing evidence,- as described in 124.105(c).
Social disadvantage is not enough to establish eligibility,
however; SBA also requires each 8(a) program partici-
pant to prove -economic disadvantage- according to the
criteria set forth in 124.106(a).
  The other SBA program relevant to this case is the
-8(d) subcontracting program,- which unlike the 8(a)
program is limited to eligibility for subcontracting
provisions like the one at issue here.  In determining
eligibility, the SBA presumes social disadvantage based
on membership in certain minority groups, just as in the
8(a) program, and again appears to require an individu-
alized, although -less restrictive,- showing of economic
disadvantage, 124.106(b).  A different set of regulations,
however, says that members of minority groups wishing
to participate in the 8(d) subcontracting program are
entitled to a race-based presumption of social and
economic disadvantage.  48 CFR 19.001, 19.703(a)(2)
(1994).  We are left with some uncertainty as to whether
participation in the 8(d) subcontracting program re-
quires an individualized showing of economic disad-
vantage.  In any event, in both the 8(a) and the 8(d)
programs, the presumptions of disadvantage are rebutta-
ble if a third party comes forward with evidence suggest-
ing that the participant is not, in fact, either economi-
cally or socially disadvantaged.  13 CFR 124.111(c)-(d),
124.601-124.609 (1994).
  The contract giving rise to the dispute in this case
came about as a result of the Surface Transportation
and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L.
100-17, 101 Stat. 132 (STURAA), a DOT appropriations
measure.  Section 106(c)(1) of STURAA provides that
-not less than 10 percent- of the appropriated funds
-shall be expended with small business concerns owned
and controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals.-  101 Stat. 145.  STURAA adopts the
Small Business Act's definition of -socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged individual,- including the applicable
race-based presumptions, and adds that -women shall be
presumed to be socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals for purposes of this subsection.-
106(c)(2)(B), 101 Stat. 146.  STURAA also requires the
Secretary of Transportation to establish -minimum
uniform criteria for State governments to use in certify-
ing whether a concern qualifies for purposes of this
subsection.-  106(c)(4), 101 Stat. 146.  The Secretary
has done so in 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D (1994).  Those
regulations say that the certifying authority should
presume both social and economic disadvantage (i. e.,
eligibility to participate) if the applicant belongs to
certain racial groups, or is a woman.  49 CFR 23.62
(1994); 49 CFR pt. 23, subpt. D, App. C (1994).  As with
the SBA programs, third parties may come forward with
evidence in an effort to rebut the presumption of
disadvantage for a particular business.  49 CFR 23.69
(1994).
  The operative clause in the contract in this case reads
as follows:
-Subcontracting.  This subsection is supplemented to
include a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE)
Development and Subcontracting Provision as
follows:
      -Monetary compensation is offered for awarding
subcontracts to small business concerns owned and
controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
taged individuals. . . .
      -A small business concern will be considered a
DBE after it has been certified as such by the U. S.
Small Business Administration or any State High-
way Agency.  Certification by other Government
agencies, counties, or cities may be acceptable on an
individual basis provided the Contracting Officer has
determined the certifying agency has an acceptable
and viable DBE certification program.  If the
Contractor requests payment under this provision,
the Contractor shall furnish the engineer with
acceptable evidence of the subcontractor(s) DBE
certification and shall furnish one certified copy of
the executed subcontract(s).
             .        .        .       .        .
      -The Contractor will be paid an amount computed
as follows:
      -1. If a subcontract is awarded to one DBE, 10
percent of the final amount of the approved DBE
subcontract, not to exceed 1.5 percent of the original
contract amount.
      -2. If subcontracts are awarded to two or more
DBEs, 10 percent of the final amount of the ap-
proved DBE subcontracts, not to exceed 2 percent of
the original contract amount.-  App. 24-26.
To benefit from this clause, Mountain Gravel had to hire
a subcontractor who had been certified as a small
disadvantaged business by the SBA, a state highway
agency, or some other certifying authority acceptable to
the Contracting Officer.  Any of the three routes to such
certification described above-SBA's 8(a) or 8(d) program,
or certification by a State under the DOT regula-
tions-would meet that requirement.  The record does
not reveal how Gonzales obtained its certification as a
small disadvantaged business.
  After losing the guardrail subcontract to Gonzales,
Adarand filed suit against various federal officials in the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado,
claiming that the race-based presumptions involved in
the use of subcontracting compensation clauses violate
Adarand's right to equal protection.  The District Court
granted the Government's motion for summary judgment.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Skinner, 790 F. Supp. 240
(1992).  The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.  16 F. 3d 1537 (1994).  It understood our
decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980),
to have adopted -a lenient standard, resembling interme-
diate scrutiny, in assessing- the constitutionality of
federal race-based action.  16 F. 3d, at 1544.  Applying
that -lenient standard,- as further developed in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547 (1990), the
Court of Appeals upheld the use of subcontractor
compensation clauses.  16 F. 3d, at 1547.  We granted
certiorari.  512 U. S. ___ (1994).

                           II
  Adarand, in addition to its general prayer for -such
other and further relief as to the Court seems just and
equitable,- specifically seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief against any future use of subcontractor compensa-
tion clauses.  App. 22-23 (complaint).  Before reaching
the merits of Adarand's challenge, we must consider
whether Adarand has standing to seek forward-looking
relief.  Adarand's allegation that it has lost a contract
in the past because of a subcontractor compensation
clause of course entitles it to seek damages for the loss
of that contract (we express no view, however, as to
whether sovereign immunity would bar such relief on
these facts).  But as we explained in Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 (1983), the fact of past injury,
-while presumably affording [the plaintiff] standing to
claim damages . . . , does nothing to establish a real
and immediate threat that he would again- suffer
similar injury in the future.  Id., at 105.
  If Adarand is to maintain its claim for forward-looking
relief, our cases require it to allege that the use of
subcontractor compensation clauses in the future
constitutes -an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.-  Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (foot-
note, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Adarand's claim that the Government's use of subcon-
tractor compensation clauses denies it equal protection
of the laws of course alleges an invasion of a legally
protected interest, and it does so in a manner that is
-particularized- as to Adarand.  We note that, contrary
to the respondents' suggestion, see Brief for Respondents
29-30, Adarand need not demonstrate that it has been,
or will be, the low bidder on a government contract.
The injury in cases of this kind is that a -discriminatory
classification prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on
an equal footing.-  General Contractors v. Jacksonville,
508 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 11).  The ag-
grieved party -need not allege that he would have
obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to
establish standing.-  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9).
  It is less clear, however, that the future use of subcon-
tractor compensation clauses will cause Adarand -immi-
nent- injury.  We said in Lujan that -[a]lthough `immi-
nence' is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it
cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to
insure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for
Article III purposes-that the injury is `certainly impend-
ing.'-  Lujan, supra, at 565, n. 2.  We therefore must
ask whether Adarand has made an adequate showing
that sometime in the relatively near future it will bid on
another government contract that offers financial
incentives to a prime contractor for hiring disadvantaged
subcontractors.
  We conclude that Adarand has satisfied this require-
ment.  Adarand's general manager said in a deposition
that his company bids on every guardrail project in
Colorado.  See Reply Brief for Petitioner 5-A.  According
to documents produced in discovery, the CFLHD let
fourteen prime contracts in Colorado that included
guardrail work between 1983 and 1990.  Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 90-C-1413, Exh.
I, Attachment A (D. Colo.).  Two of those contracts do
not present the kind of injury Adarand alleges here.  In
one, the prime contractor did not subcontract out the
guardrail work; in another, the prime contractor was
itself a disadvantaged business, and in such cases the
contract generally does not include a subcontractor
compensation clause.  Ibid.; see also id., Supplemental
Exhibits, Deposition of Craig Actis 14 (testimony of
CFLHD employee that 8(a) contracts do not include
subcontractor compensation clauses).  Thus, statistics
from the years 1983 through 1990 indicate that the
CFLHD lets on average one and one half contracts per
year that could injure Adarand in the manner it alleges
here.  Nothing in the record suggests that the CFLHD
has altered the frequency with which it lets contracts
that include guardrail work.  And the record indicates
that Adarand often must compete for contracts against
companies certified as small disadvantaged businesses.
See id., Exh. F, Attachments 1-3.  Because the evidence
in this case indicates that the CFLHD is likely to let
contracts involving guardrail work that contain a
subcontractor compensation clause at least once per year
in Colorado, that Adarand is very likely to bid on each
such contract, and that Adarand often must compete for
such contracts against small disadvantaged businesses,
we are satisfied that Adarand has standing to bring this
lawsuit.

                           III
  The Government urges that -[t]he Subcontracting
Compensation Clause program is . . . a program based
on disadvantage, not on race,- and thus that it is subject
only to -the most relaxed judicial scrutiny.-  Brief for
Respondents 26.  To the extent that the statutes and
regulations involved in this case are race neutral, we
agree.  The Government concedes, however, that -the
race-based rebuttable presumption used in some certifi-
cation determinations under the Subcontracting Compen-
sation Clause- is subject to some heightened level of
scrutiny.  Id., at 27.  The parties disagree as to what
that level should be.  (We note, incidentally, that this
case concerns only classifications based explicitly on
race, and presents none of the additional difficulties
posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result
in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by
a racially discriminatory purpose.  See generally Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U. S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S.
229 (1976).)
  Adarand's claim arises under the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, which provides that -No person shall
. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.-  Although this Court has always
understood that Clause to provide some measure of
protection against arbitrary treatment by the Federal
Government, it is not as explicit a guarantee of equal
treatment as the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides
that -No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws- (emphasis
added).  Our cases have accorded varying degrees of
significance to the difference in the language of those
two Clauses.  We think it necessary to revisit the issue
here.

                            A
  Through the 1940s, this Court had routinely taken the
view in non-race-related cases that, -[u]nlike the Four-
teenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal protec-
tion clause and it provides no guaranty against discrimi-
natory legislation by Congress.-  Detroit Bank v. United
States, 317 U. S. 329, 337 (1943); see also, e. g.,
Helvering v. Lerner Stores Corp., 314 U. S. 463, 468
(1941); LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S.
377, 392 (1921) (-Reference is made to cases decided
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . ; but clearly they are not in point.  The
Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause-).
When the Court first faced a Fifth Amendment equal
protection challenge to a federal racial classification, it
adopted a similar approach, with most unfortunate
results.  In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81
(1943), the Court considered a curfew applicable only to
persons of Japanese ancestry.  The Court ob-
served-correctly-that -[d]istinctions between citizens
solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality,- and that -racial discrimi-
nations are in most circumstances irrelevant and
therefore prohibited.-  Id., at 100.  But it also cited
Detroit Bank for the proposition that the Fifth Amend-
ment -restrains only such discriminatory legislation by
Congress as amounts to a denial of due process,- ibid.,
and upheld the curfew because -circumstances within
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility
for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational
basis for the decision which they made.-  Id., at 102.
  Eighteen months later, the Court again approved
wartime measures directed at persons of Japanese
ancestry.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214
(1944), concerned an order that completely excluded such
persons from particular areas.  The Court did not
address the view, expressed in cases like Hirabayashi
and Detroit Bank, that the Federal Government's
obligation to provide equal protection differs significantly
from that of the States.  Instead, it began by noting
that -all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . .
[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.-  323 U. S., at 216.  That promising dictum
might be read to undermine the view that the Federal
Government is under a lesser obligation to avoid
injurious racial classifications than are the States.  Cf.
id., at 234-235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (-[T]he order
deprives all those within its scope of the equal protec-
tion of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amend-
ment-).  But in spite of the -most rigid scrutiny-
standard it had just set forth, the Court then inexplica-
bly relied on -the principles we announced in the
Hirabayashi case,- id., at 217, to conclude that, although
-exclusion from the area in which one's home is located
is a far greater deprivation than constant confinement
to the home from 8 p. m. to 6 a. m.,- id., at 218, the
racially discriminatory order was nonetheless within the
Federal Government's power.
  In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497 (1954), the Court
for the first time explicitly questioned the existence of
any difference between the obligations of the Federal
Government and the States to avoid racial classifica-
tions.  Bolling did note that -[t]he `equal protection of
the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than `due process of law,'- id., at 499.  But
Bolling then concluded that, -[i]n view of [the] decision
that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintain-
ing racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.-  Id., at 500.
  Bolling's facts concerned school desegregation, but its
reasoning was not so limited.  The Court's observations
that -[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of
their ancestry are by their very nature odious,- Hira-
bayashi, 320 U. S., at 100, and that -all legal restric-
tions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect,- Korematsu, 323 U. S.,
at 216, carry no less force in the context of federal
action than in the context of action by the
States-indeed, they first appeared in cases concerning
action by the Federal Government.  Bolling relied on
those observations, 347 U. S., at 499, n. 3, and reiter-
ated -`that the Constitution of the United States, in its
present form, forbids, so far as civil and political rights
are concerned, discrimination by the General Govern-
ment, or by the States, against any citizen because of his
race,'- id., at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162
U. S. 565, 591 (1896)) (emphasis added).  The Court's
application of that general principle to the case before it,
and the resulting imposition on the Federal Government
of an obligation equivalent to that of the States, followed
as a matter of course.
  Later cases in contexts other than school desegregation
did not distinguish between the duties of the States and
the Federal Government to avoid racial classifications.
Consider, for example, the following passage from
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, a 1964 case that
struck down a race-based state law:
-[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the
race of the participants, which must be viewed in
light of the historical fact that the central purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate
racial discrimination emanating from official sources
in the States.  This strong policy renders racial
classifications `constitutionally suspect,' Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499; and subject to the `most
rigid scrutiny,' Korematsu v. United States, 323
U. S. 214, 216; and `in most circumstances irrele-
vant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative
purpose, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81,
100.-  Id., at 191-192.
McLaughlin's reliance on cases involving federal action
for the standards applicable to a case involving state
legislation suggests that the Court understood the
standards for federal and state racial classifications to
be the same.
  Cases decided after McLaughlin continued to treat the
equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and
the Fourteenth Amendments as indistinguishable; one
commentator observed that -[i]n case after case, fifth
amendment equal protection problems are discussed on
the assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents
are controlling.-  Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guaran-
tee of Equal Protection, 55 N. C. L. Rev. 541, 554
(1977).  Loving v. Virginia, which struck down a race-
based state law, cited Korematsu for the proposition that
-the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications . . . be subjected to the `most rigid
scrutiny.'-  388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967).  The various opinions
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), which
concerned sex discrimination by the Federal Government,
took their equal protection standard of review from Reed
v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71 (1971), a case that invalidated sex
discrimination by a State, without mentioning any
possibility of a difference between the standards applica-
ble to state and federal action.  Frontiero, 411 U. S., at
682-684 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at 691
(Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 692 (Powell,
J., concurring in judgment).  Thus, in 1975, the Court
stated explicitly that -[t]his Court's approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claims has always been
precisely the same as to equal protection claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment.-  Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U. S. 636, 638, n. 2 (1975); see also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93 (1976) (-Equal protection analysis
in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment-); United States v. Paradise,
480 U. S. 149, 166, n. 16 (1987) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.) (-[T]he reach of the equal protection
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with
that of the Fourteenth-).  We do not understand a few
contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we
found special deference to the political branches of the
Federal Government to be appropriate, e. g., Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100, 101-102, n. 21
(1976) (federal power over immigration), to detract from
this general rule.

                            B
  Most of the cases discussed above involved classifica-
tions burdening groups that have suffered discrimination
in our society.  In 1978, the Court confronted the
question whether race-based governmental action
designed to benefit such groups should also be subject to
-the most rigid scrutiny.-  Regents of Univ. of California
v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, involved an equal protection
challenge to a state-run medical school's practice of
reserving a number of spaces in its entering class for
minority students.  The petitioners argued that -strict
scrutiny- should apply only to -classifications that
disadvantage `discrete and insular minorities.'-  Id., at
287-288 (opinion of Powell, J.) (citing United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938)).
Bakke did not produce an opinion for the Court, but
Justice Powell's opinion announcing the Court's judg-
ment rejected the argument.  In a passage joined by
Justice White, Justice Powell wrote that -[t]he guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied
to one individual and something else when applied to a
person of another color.-  438 U. S., at 289-290.  He
concluded that -[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any
sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination.-  Id., at 291.  On the
other hand, four Justices in Bakke would have applied
a less stringent standard of review to racial classifica-
tions -designed to further remedial purposes,- see id., at
359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
And four Justices thought the case should be decided on
statutory grounds.  Id., at 411-412, 421 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Burger, C. J., Stewart, and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part).
  Two years after Bakke, the Court faced another
challenge to remedial race-based action, this time
involving action undertaken by the Federal Government.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), the Court
upheld Congress' inclusion of a 10% set-aside for
minority-owned businesses in the Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977.  As in Bakke, there was no opinion
for the Court.  Chief Justice Burger, in an opinion
joined by Justices White and Powell, observed that
-[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must
necessarily receive a most searching examination to
make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional
guarantees.-  448 U. S., at 491.  That opinion, however,
-d[id] not adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the
formulas of analysis articulated in such cases as
[Bakke].-  Id., at 492.  It employed instead a two-part
test which asked, first, -whether the objectives of th[e]
legislation are within the power of Congress,- and
second, -whether the limited use of racial and ethnic
criteria, in the context presented, is a constitutionally
permissible means for achieving the congressional
objectives.-  Id., at 473.  It then upheld the program
under that test, adding at the end of the opinion that
the program also -would survive judicial review under
either `test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions.-
Id., at 492.  Justice Powell wrote separately to express
his view that the plurality opinion had essentially
applied -strict scrutiny- as described in his Bakke
opinion-i. e., it had determined that the set-aside was
-a necessary means of advancing a compelling govern-
mental interest--and had done so correctly.  448 U. S.,
at 496 (concurring opinion).  Justice Stewart (joined by
then-Justice Rehnquist) dissented, arguing that the
Constitution required the Federal Government to meet
the same strict standard as the States when enacting
racial classifications, id., at 523, and n. 1, and that the
program before the Court failed that standard.  Justice
Stevens also dissented, arguing that -[r]acial classifica-
tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classifi-
cation,- id., at 537, and that the program before the
Court could not be characterized -as a `narrowly tailored'
remedial measure.-  Id., at 541.  Justice Marshall
(joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun) concurred in
the judgment, reiterating the view of four Justices in
Bakke that any race-based governmental action designed
to -remed[y] the present effects of past racial discrimina-
tion- should be upheld if it was -substantially related-
to the achievement of an -important governmental
objective--i. e., such action should be subjected only to
what we now call -intermediate scrutiny.-  448 U. S., at
518-519.
  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Ed., 476 U. S. 267
(1986), the Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to another form of remedial racial classifica-
tion.  The issue in Wygant was whether a school board
could adopt race-based preferences in determining which
teachers to lay off.  Justice Powell's plurality opinion
observed that -the level of scrutiny does not change
merely because the challenged classification operates
against a group that historically has not been subject to
governmental discrimination,- id., at 273, and stated the
two-part inquiry as -whether the layoff provision is
supported by a compelling state purpose and whether
the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are
narrowly tailored.-  Id., at 274.  In other words, -racial
classifications of any sort must be subjected to `strict
scrutiny.'-  Id., at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).  The plurality then
concluded that the school board's interest in -providing
minority role models for its minority students, as an
attempt to alleviate the effects of societal discrimina-
tion,- id., at 274, was not a compelling interest that
could justify the use of a racial classification.  It added
that -[s]ocietal discrimination, without more, is too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified
remedy,- id., at 276, and insisted instead that -a public
employer . . . must ensure that, before it embarks on an
affirmative-action program, it has convincing evidence
that remedial action is warranted.  That is, it must have
sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there
has been prior discrimination,- id., at 277.  Justice
White concurred only in the judgment, although he
agreed that the school board's asserted interests could
not, -singly or together, justify this racially discrimina-
tory layoff policy.-  Id., at 295.  Four Justices dissented,
three of whom again argued for intermediate scrutiny of
remedial race-based government action.  Id., at 301-302
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
  The Court's failure to produce a majority opinion in
Bakke, Fullilove, and Wygant left unresolved the proper
analysis for remedial race-based governmental action.
See United States v. Paradise, 480 U. S., at 166 (plural-
ity opinion of Brennan, J.) (-[A]lthough this Court has
consistently held that some elevated level of scrutiny is
required when a racial or ethnic distinction is made for
remedial purposes, it has yet to reach consensus on the
appropriate constitutional analysis-); Sheet Metal
Workers v. EEOC, 478 U. S. 421, 480 (1986) (plurality
opinion of Brennan, J.).  Lower courts found this lack of
guidance unsettling.  See, e. g., Kromnick v. School Dist.
of Philadelphia, 739 F. 2d 894, 901 (CA3 1984) (-The
absence of an Opinion of the Court in either Bakke or
Fullilove and the concomitant failure of the Court to
articulate an analytic framework supporting the judg-
ments makes the position of the lower federal courts
considering the constitutionality of affirmative action
programs somewhat vulnerable-), cert. denied, 469 U. S.
1107 (1985); Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F. 2d 1554,
1567 (CA5 1984) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., concurring
specially); South Florida Chapter of Associated General
Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade
County, Fla., 723 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA11), cert. denied,
469 U. S. 871 (1984).
  The Court resolved the issue, at least in part, in 1989.
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989),
concerned a city's determination that 30% of its contract-
ing work should go to minority-owned businesses.  A
majority of the Court in Croson held that -the standard
of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by
a particular classification,- and that the single standard
of review for racial classifications should be -strict
scrutiny.-  Id., at 493-494 (opinion of O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C. J., White, and Kennedy, JJ.);
id., at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (-I agree
. . . with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that strict
scrutiny must be applied to all governmental classifica-
tion by race-).  As to the classification before the Court,
the plurality agreed that -a state or local subdivision
. . . has the authority to eradicate the effects of private
discrimination within its own legislative jurisdiction,- id.,
at 491-492, but the Court thought that the city had not
acted with -a `strong basis in evidence for its conclusion
that remedial action was necessary,'- id., at 500 (major-
ity opinion) (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality
opinion)).  The Court also thought it -obvious that [the]
program is not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects
of prior discrimination.-  488 U. S., at 508.
  With Croson, the Court finally agreed that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires strict scrutiny of all
race-based action by state and local governments.  But
Croson of course had no occasion to declare what
standard of review the Fifth Amendment requires for
such action taken by the Federal Government.  Croson
observed simply that the Court's -treatment of an
exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be
dispositive here,- because Croson's facts did not impli-
cate Congress' broad power under 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Croson, 488 U. S., at 491 (plurality
opinion); see also id., at 522 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (-[W]ithout revisiting what we held in
Fullilove . . . , I do not believe our decision in that case
controls the one before us here-).  On the other hand,
the Court subsequently indicated that Croson had at
least some bearing on federal race-based action when it
vacated a decision upholding such action and remanded
for further consideration in light of Croson.  H. K. Porter
Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 489 U. S. 1062 (1989);
see also Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC,
876 F. 2d 902, 915, n. 16 (CADC 1989) (opinion of
Silberman, J.) (noting the Court's action in H. K. Porter
Co.), rev'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U. S. 547 (1990).  Thus, some uncertainty persisted
with respect to the standard of review for federal racial
classifications.  See, e. g., Mann v. City of Albany, Ga.,
883 F. 2d 999, 1006 (CA11 1989) (Croson -may be
applicable to race-based classifications imposed by
Congress-); Shurberg, supra, at 910 (noting the difficulty
of extracting general principles from the Court's frac-
tured opinions); id., at 959 (Wald, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (-Croson certainly did not
resolve the substantial questions posed by congressional
programs which mandate the use of racial preferences-);
Winter Park Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F. 2d
347, 366 (CADC 1989) (Williams, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (-The unresolved ambiguity of
Fullilove and Croson leaves it impossible to reach a firm
opinion as to the evidence of discrimination needed to
sustain a congressional mandate of racial preferences-),
aff'd sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, supra.
  Despite lingering uncertainty in the details, however,
the Court's cases through Croson had established three
general propositions with respect to governmental racial
classifications.  First, skepticism: -`[a]ny preference
based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily
receive a most searching examination,'- Wygant, 476
U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion of Powell, J.); Fullilove,
448 U. S., at 491 (opinion of Burger, C. J.); see also id.,
at 523 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (-[A]ny official action
that treats a person differently on account of his race or
ethnic origin is inherently suspect-); McLaughlin, 379
U. S., at 192 (-[R]acial classifications [are] `constitution-
ally suspect'-); Hirabayashi, 320 U. S., at 100 (-Dis-
tinctions between citizens solely because of their ances-
try are by their very nature odious to a free people-).
Second, consistency: -the standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of
those burdened or benefited by a particular classifica-
tion,- Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); id.,
at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Bakke, 438 U. S., at 289-290 (opinion of Powell, J.),
i. e., all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal
Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.  And
third, congruence: -[e]qual protection analysis in the
Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment,- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at
93; see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 638,
n. 2; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S., at 500.  Taken
together, these three propositions lead to the conclusion
that any person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the
Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting
that person to unequal treatment under the strictest
judicial scrutiny.  Justice Powell's defense of this
conclusion bears repeating here:
      -If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial
protection against classifications based upon his
racial or ethnic background because such distinctions
impinge upon personal rights, rather than the
individual only because of his membership in a
particular group, then constitutional standards may
be applied consistently.  Political judgments regard-
ing the necessity for the particular classification
may be weighed in the constitutional balance, [Kore-
matsu], but the standard of justification will remain
constant.  This is as it should be, since those
political judgments are the product of rough compro-
mise struck by contending groups within the demo-
cratic process.  When they touch upon an indi-
vidual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to
a judicial determination that the burden he is asked
to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.  The Constitution
guarantees that right to every person regardless of
his background.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. [1,
22 (1948)].-  Bakke, 438 U. S., at 299 (opinion of
Powell, J.) (footnote omitted).
  A year later, however, the Court took a surprising
turn.  Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547
(1990), involved a Fifth Amendment challenge to two
race-based policies of the Federal Communications
Commission.  In Metro Broadcasting, the Court repudi-
ated the long-held notion that -it would be unthinkable
that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government- than it does on a State to
afford equal protection of the laws, Bolling, supra, at
500.  It did so by holding that -benign- federal racial
classifications need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny,
even though Croson had recently concluded that such
classifications enacted by a State must satisfy strict
scrutiny.  -[B]enign- federal racial classifications, the
Court said, --even if those measures are not `remedial'
in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of
past governmental or societal discrimination-are
constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.-  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U. S., at
564-565 (emphasis added).  The Court did not explain
how to tell whether a racial classification should be
deemed -benign,- other than to express -confiden[ce] that
an `examination of the legislative scheme and its history'
will separate benign measures from other types of racial
classifications.-  Id., at 564, n. 12 (citation omitted).
  Applying this test, the Court first noted that the FCC
policies at issue did not serve as a remedy for past
discrimination.  Id., at 566.  Proceeding on the assump-
tion that the policies were nonetheless -benign,- it
concluded that they served the -important governmental
objective- of -enhancing broadcast diversity,- id., at
566-567, and that they were -substantially related- to
that objective, id., at 569.  It therefore upheld the
policies.
  By adopting intermediate scrutiny as the standard of
review for congressionally mandated -benign- racial
classifications, Metro Broadcasting departed from prior
cases in two significant respects.  First, it turned its
back on Croson's explanation of why strict scrutiny of all
governmental racial classifications is essential:
      -Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justifi-
cation for such race-based measures, there is simply
no way of determining what classifications are
`benign' or `remedial' and what classifications are in
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.  Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to `smoke out' illegiti-
mate uses of race by assuring that the legislative
body is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool.  The test also
ensures that the means chosen `fit' this compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate
racial prejudice or stereotype.-  Croson, supra, at
493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
We adhere to that view today, despite the surface appeal
of holding -benign- racial classifications to a lower
standard, because -it may not always be clear that a so-
called preference is in fact benign,- Bakke, supra, at 298
(opinion of Powell, J.).  -[M]ore than good motives
should be required when government seeks to allocate
its resources by way of an explicit racial classification
system.-  Days, Fullilove, 96 Yale L. J. 453, 485 (1987).
  Second, Metro Broadcasting squarely rejected one of
the three propositions established by the Court's earlier
equal protection cases, namely, congruence between the
standards applicable to federal and state racial classifi-
cations, and in so doing also undermined the other
two-skepticism of all racial classifications, and consis-
tency of treatment irrespective of the race of the
burdened or benefited group.  See supra, at 21-22.
Under Metro Broadcasting, certain racial classifications
(-benign- ones enacted by the Federal Government)
should be treated less skeptically than others; and the
race of the benefited group is critical to the determi-
nation of which standard of review to apply.  Metro
Broadcasting was thus a significant departure from
much of what had come before it.
  The three propositions undermined by Metro Broad-
casting all derive from the basic principle that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups.  It follows from that principle that
all governmental action based on race-a group classifi-
cation long recognized as -in most circumstances irrele-
vant and therefore prohibited,- Hirabayashi, supra, at
100-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the
laws has not been infringed.  These ideas have long
been central to this Court's understanding of equal
protection, and holding -benign- state and federal racial
classifications to different standards does not square
with them.  -[A] free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality,- ibid., should
tolerate no retreat from the principle that government
may treat people differently because of their race only
for the most compelling reasons.  Accordingly, we hold
today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only
if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.  To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it
is overruled.
  In dissent, Justice Stevens criticizes us for -deliv-
er[ing] a disconcerting lecture about the evils of govern-
mental racial classifications,- post, at 1.  With respect,
we believe his criticisms reflect a serious misunderstand-
ing of our opinion.
  Justice Stevens concurs in our view that courts
should take a skeptical view of all governmental racial
classifications.  Post, at 1-2.  He also allows that
-[n]othing is inherently wrong with applying a single
standard to fundamentally different situations, as long
as that standard takes relevant differences into account.-
Post, at 6.  What he fails to recognize is that strict
scrutiny does take -relevant differences- into
account-indeed, that is its fundamental purpose.  The
point of carefully examining the interest asserted by the
government in support of a racial classification, and the
evidence offered to show that the classification is
needed, is precisely to distinguish legitimate from
illegitimate uses of race in governmental decisionmaking.
See supra, at 24-25.  And Justice Stevens concedes
that -some cases may be difficult to classify,- post, at 5,
and n. 4; all the more reason, in our view, to examine
all racial classifications carefully.  Strict scrutiny does
not -trea[t] dissimilar race-based decisions as though
they were equally objectionable,- post, at 5; to the
contrary, it evaluates carefully all governmental race-
based decisions in order to decide which are constitution-
ally objectionable and which are not.  By requiring strict
scrutiny of racial classifications, we require courts to
make sure that a governmental classification based on
race, which -so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for
disparate treatment,- Fullilove, supra, at 534 (Stevens,
J., dissenting), is legitimate, before permitting unequal
treatment based on race to proceed.
  Justice Stevens chides us for our -supposed inability
to differentiate between `invidious' and `benign' discrimi-
nation,- because it is in his view sufficient that -people
understand the difference between good intentions and
bad.-  Post, at 5.  But, as we have just explained, the
point of strict scrutiny is to -differentiate between-
permissible and impermissible governmental use of race.
And Justice Stevens himself has already explained in
his dissent in Fullilove why -good intentions- alone are
not enough to sustain a supposedly -benign- racial
classification: -[E]ven though it is not the actual predi-
cate for this legislation, a statute of this kind inevitably
is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that
those who are granted this special preference are less
qualified in some respect that is identified purely by
their race.  Because that perception-especially when
fostered by the Congress of the United States-can only
exacerbate rather than reduce racial prejudice, it will
delay the time when race will become a truly irrelevant,
or at least insignificant, factor.  Unless Congress clearly
articulates the need and basis for a racial classification,
and also tailors the classification to its justification, the
Court should not uphold this kind of statute.-  Fullilove,
supra, at 545 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added;
footnote omitted); see also id., at 537 (-Racial classifica-
tions are simply too pernicious to permit any but the
most exact connection between justification and classifi-
cation-); Croson, supra, at 516-517 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in judgment) (-Although [the
legislation at issue] stigmatizes the disadvantaged class
with the unproven charge of past racial discrimination,
it actually imposes a greater stigma on its supposed
beneficiaries-); supra, at 24-25; but cf. post, at 5-6
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  These passages make a
persuasive case for requiring strict scrutiny of congres-
sional racial classifications.
  Perhaps it is not the standard of strict scrutiny itself,
but our use of the concepts of -consistency- and -congru-
ence- in conjunction with it, that leads Justice Stevens
to dissent.  According to Justice Stevens, our view of
consistency -equate[s] remedial preferences with invidi-
ous discrimination,- post, at 6, and ignores the difference
between -an engine of oppression- and an effort -to
foster equality in society,- or, more colorfully, -between
a `No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat,- post, at 2,
4.  It does nothing of the kind.  The principle of consis-
tency simply means that whenever the government
treats any person unequally because of his or her race,
that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely
within the language and spirit of the Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection.  It says nothing about the
ultimate validity of any particular law; that determina-
tion is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.  The
principle of consistency explains the circumstances in
which the injury requiring strict scrutiny occurs.  The
application of strict scrutiny, in turn, determines
whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the
infliction of that injury.
  Consistency does recognize that any individual suffers
an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the
government because of his or her race, whatever that
race may be.  This Court clearly stated that principle in
Croson, see 488 U. S., at 493-494 (plurality opinion); id.,
at 520-521 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see also
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. ___, ___ (1993); Powers v. Ohio,
499 U. S. 400, 410 (1991).  Justice Stevens does not
explain how his views square with Croson, or with the
long line of cases understanding equal protection as a
personal right.
  Justice Stevens also claims that we have ignored any
difference between federal and state legislatures.  But
requiring that Congress, like the States, enact racial
classifications only when doing so is necessary to further
a -compelling interest- does not contravene any principle
of appropriate respect for a co-equal Branch of the
Government.  It is true that various Members of this
Court have taken different views of the authority 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment confers upon Congress to
deal with the problem of racial discrimination, and the
extent to which courts should defer to Congress' exercise
of that authority.  See, e. g., Metro Broadcasting, supra,
at 605-606 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Croson, supra, at
486-493 (opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, J.); id., at 518-519 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at
521-524 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Fullilove,
supra, at 472-473 (opinion of Burger, C. J.); id., at
500-502, and nn. 2-3, 515, and n. 14 (Powell, J.,
concurring); id., at 526-527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
We need not, and do not, address these differences
today.  For now, it is enough to observe that Justice
Stevens' suggestion that any Member of this Court has
repudiated in this case his or her previously expressed
views on the subject, post, at 9-13, 17, is incorrect.

                            C
  -Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly
required in constitutional cases, any departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.-
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984).  In
deciding whether this case presents such justification,
we recall Justice Frankfurter's admonition that -stare
decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical
formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves
collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its
scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.-
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940).
Remaining true to an -intrinsically sounder- doctrine
established in prior cases better serves the values of
stare decisis than would following a more recently
decided case inconsistent with the decisions that came
before it; the latter course would simply compound the
recent error and would likely make the unjustified break
from previously established doctrine complete.  In such
a situation, -special justification- exists to depart from
the recently decided case.
  As we have explained, Metro Broadcasting undermined
important principles of this Court's equal protection
jurisprudence, established in a line of cases stretching
back over fifty years, see supra, at 11-23.  Those princi-
ples together stood for an -embracing- and -intrinsically
soun[d]- understanding of equal protection -verified by
experience,- namely, that the Constitution imposes upon
federal, state, and local governmental actors the same
obligation to respect the personal right to equal protec-
tion of the laws.  This case therefore presents precisely
the situation described by Justice Frankfurter in
Helvering: we cannot adhere to our most recent decision
without colliding with an accepted and established
doctrine.  We also note that Metro Broadcasting's
application of different standards of review to federal
and state racial classifications has been consistently
criticized by commentators.  See, e. g., Fried, Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts of Equality,
104 Harv. L. Rev. 107, 113-117 (1990) (arguing that
Metro Broadcasting's adoption of different standards of
review for federal and state racial classifications placed
the law in an -unstable condition,- and advocating strict
scrutiny across the board); Devins, Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 Texas L.
Rev. 125, 145-146 (1990) (same); Linder, Review of
Affirmative Action After Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: The
Solution Almost Nobody Wanted, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 293,
297, 316-317 (1991) (criticizing -anomalous results as
exemplified by the two different standards of review-);
Katz, Public Affirmative Action and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Fragmentation of Theory After Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Commission, 17 T. Marshall L.
Rev. 317, 319, 354-355, 357 (1992) (arguing that -the
current fragmentation of doctrine must be seen as a
dangerous and seriously flawed approach to constitu-
tional interpretation,- and advocating intermediate
scrutiny across the board).
  Our past practice in similar situations supports our
action today.  In United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. ___
(1993), we overruled the recent case of Grady v. Corbin,
495 U. S. 508 (1990), because Grady -lack[ed] constitu-
tional roots- and was -wholly inconsistent with earlier
Supreme Court precedent.-  Dixon, supra, at ___, ___
(slip op., at 14-15, 22-23).  In Solorio v. United States,
483 U. S. 435 (1987), we overruled O'Callahan v. Parker,
395 U. S. 258 (1969), which had caused -confusion- and
had rejected -an unbroken line of decisions from 1866 to
1960.-  Solorio, supra, at 439-441, 450-451.  And in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S.
36 (1977), we overruled United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967), which was -an
abrupt and largely unexplained departure- from prece-
dent, and of which -[t]he great weight of scholarly
opinion ha[d] been critical.-  Continental T. V., supra, at
47-48, 58.  See also, e. g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S.
808, 830 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U. S.
496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U. S.
805 (1989)); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U. S. 658, 695-701 (1978) (partially
overruling Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167 (1961), because
Monroe was a -departure from prior practice- that had
not engendered substantial reliance); Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U. S. 111, 128-129 (1965) (overruling
Kesler v. Department of Public Safety of Utah, 369 U. S.
153 (1962), to reaffirm -pre-Kesler precedent- and restore
the law to the -view . . . which this Court has tradition-
ally taken- in older cases).
  It is worth pointing out the difference between the
applications of stare decisis in this case and in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. ___
(1992).  Casey explained how considerations of stare
decisis inform the decision whether to overrule a long-
established precedent that has become integrated into
the fabric of the law.  Overruling precedent of that kind
naturally may have consequences for -the ideal of the
rule of law,- id., at ___ (slip op., at 12).  In addition,
such precedent is likely to have engendered substantial
reliance, as was true in Casey itself, id., at ___ (slip op.,
at 14) (-[F]or two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relation-
ships and made choices that define their views of
themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception
should fail-).  But in this case, as we have explained, we
do not face a precedent of that kind, because Metro
Broadcasting itself departed from our prior cases-and
did so quite recently.  By refusing to follow Metro
Broadcasting, then, we do not depart from the fabric of
the law; we restore it.  We also note that reliance on a
case that has recently departed from precedent is likely
to be minimal, particularly where, as here, the rule set
forth in that case is unlikely to affect primary conduct
in any event.  Cf. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U. S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 6) (declining to
overrule Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1 (1984),
where -private parties have likely written contracts
relying upon Southland as authority- in the ten years
since Southland was decided).
  Justice Stevens takes us to task for what he per-
ceives to be an erroneous application of the doctrine of
stare decisis.  But again, he misunderstands our posi-
tion.  We have acknowledged that, after Croson, -some
uncertainty persisted with respect to the standard of
review for federal racial classifications,- supra, at 21,
and we therefore do not say that we -merely restor[e]
the status quo ante- today, post, at 17.  But as we have
described supra, at 11-25, we think that well-settled
legal principles pointed toward a conclusion different
from that reached in Metro Broadcasting, and we
therefore disagree with Justice Stevens that -the law
at the time of that decision was entirely open to the
result the Court reached,- post, at 17.  We also disagree
with Justice Stevens that Justice Stewart's dissenting
opinion in Fullilove supports his -novelty- argument, see
post, at 19, and n. 13.  Justice Stewart said that
-[u]nder our Constitution, any official action that treats
a person differently on account of his race or ethnic
origin is inherently suspect and presumptively invalid,-
and that -`[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth
Amendment area is the same as that under the Four-
teenth Amendment.'-  Fullilove, supra, at 523, and n. 1.
He took the view that -[t]he hostility of the Constitution
to racial classifications by government has been mani-
fested in many cases decided by this Court,- and that
-our cases have made clear that the Constitution is
wholly neutral in forbidding such racial discrimination,
whatever the race may be of those who are its victims.-
Id., at 524.  Justice Stewart gave no indication that he
thought he was addressing a -novel- proposition, post, at
19.  Rather, he relied on the fact that the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment extends its guarantee to -per-
sons,- and on cases like Buckley, Loving, McLaughlin,
Bolling, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu, see Fullilove,
supra, at 524-526, as do we today.  There is nothing
new about the notion that Congress, like the States,
may treat people differently because of their race only
for compelling reasons.
  -The real problem,- Justice Frankfurter explained, -is
whether a principle shall prevail over its later misappli-
cations.-  Helvering, 309 U. S., at 122.  Metro Broad-
casting's untenable distinction between state and federal
racial classifications lacks support in our precedent, and
undermines the fundamental principle of equal protec-
tion as a personal right.  In this case, as between that
principle and -its later misapplications,- the principle
must prevail.

                            D
  Our action today makes explicit what Justice Powell
thought implicit in the Fullilove lead opinion: federal
racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a
compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly
tailored to further that interest.  See Fullilove, 448
U. S., at 496 (concurring opinion).  (Recall that the lead
opinion in Fullilove -d[id] not adopt . . . the formulas of
analysis articulated in such cases as [Bakke].-  Id., at
492 (opinion of Burger, C. J.).)  Of course, it follows that
to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial
classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard,
it is no longer controlling.  But we need not decide
today whether the program upheld in Fullilove would
survive strict scrutiny as our more recent cases have
defined it.
  Some have questioned the importance of debating the
proper standard of review of race-based legislation.  See,
e. g., post, at 6-7 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Croson, 488
U. S., at 514-515, and n. 5 (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); cf. Metro Broadcast-
ing, 497 U. S., at 610 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (-This
dispute regarding the appropriate standard of review
may strike some as a lawyers' quibble over words-).  But
we agree with Justice Stevens that, -[b]ecause racial
characteristics so seldom provide a relevant basis for
disparate treatment, and because classifications based on
race are potentially so harmful to the entire body politic,
it is especially important that the reasons for any such
classification be clearly identified and unquestionably
legitimate,- and that -[r]acial classifications are simply
too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connec-
tion between justification and classification.-  Fullilove,
supra, at 533-535, 537 (dissenting opinion) (footnotes
omitted).  We think that requiring strict scrutiny is the
best way to ensure that courts will consistently give
racial classifications that kind of detailed examination,
both as to ends and as to means.  Korematsu demon-
strates vividly that even -the most rigid scrutiny- can
sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classifica-
tion, compare Korematsu, 323 U. S., at 223 (-To cast
this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without
reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue.  Korematsu was
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility
to him or his race-), with Pub. L. 100-383, 2(a), 102
Stat. 903-904 (-[T]hese actions [of relocating and
interning civilians of Japanese ancestry] were carried
out without adequate security reasons . . . and were
motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime hysteria,
and a failure of political leadership-).  Any retreat from
the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the
risk of another such error occurring in the future.
  Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is -strict in theory, but fatal in fact.-  Fullilove,
supra, at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment).
The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority
groups in this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from acting in response
to it.  As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of
this Court agreed that the Alabama Department of
Public Safety's -pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct- justified a narrowly tailored
race-based remedy.  See United States v. Paradise, 480
U. S., at 167 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at
190 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 196
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).  When race-based action is
necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is
within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
-narrow tailoring- test this Court has set out in previous
cases.

                           IV
  Because our decision today alters the playing field in
some important respects, we think it best to remand the
case to the lower courts for further consideration in light
of the principles we have announced.  The Court of
Appeals, following Metro Broadcasting and Fullilove,
analyzed the case in terms of intermediate scrutiny.  It
upheld the challenged statutes and regulations because
it found them to be -narrowly tailored to achieve [their]
significant governmental purpose of providing subcon-
tracting opportunities for small disadvantaged business
enterprises.-  16 F. 3d, at 1547 (emphasis added).  The
Court of Appeals did not decide the question whether
the interests served by the use of subcontractor compen-
sation clauses are properly described as -compelling.-  It
also did not address the question of narrow tailoring in
terms of our strict scrutiny cases, by asking, for exam-
ple, whether there was -any consideration of the use of
race-neutral means to increase minority business
participation- in government contracting, Croson, supra,
at 507, or whether the program was appropriately
limited such that it -will not last longer than the
discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate,-
Fullilove, supra, at 513 (Powell, J., concurring).
  Moreover, unresolved questions remain concerning the
details of the complex regulatory regimes implicated by
the use of subcontractor compensation clauses.  For
example, the SBA's 8(a) program requires an individual-
ized inquiry into the economic disadvantage of every
participant, see 13 CFR 124.106(a) (1994), whereas the
DOT's regulations implementing STURAA 106(c) do not
require certifying authorities to make such individualized
inquiries, see 49 CFR 23.62 (1994); 49 CFR pt. 23,
subpt. D, App. C (1994).  And the regulations seem
unclear as to whether 8(d) subcontractors must make
individualized showings, or instead whether the race-
based presumption applies both to social and economic
disadvantage, compare 13 CFR 124.106(b) (apparently
requiring 8(d) participants to make an individualized
showing), with 48 CFR 19.703(a)(2) (1994) (apparently
allowing 8(d) subcontractors to invoke the race-based
presumption for social and economic disadvantage).  See
generally Part I, supra.  We also note an apparent
discrepancy between the definitions of which socially
disadvantaged individuals qualify as economically disad-
vantaged for the 8(a) and 8(d) programs; the former
requires a showing that such individuals' ability to
compete has been impaired -as compared to others in
the same or similar line of business who are not socially
disadvantaged,- 13 CFR 124.106(a)(1)(i) (1994) (empha-
sis added), while the latter requires that showing only
-as compared to others in the same or similar line of
business,- 124.106(b)(1).  The question whether any of
the ways in which the Government uses subcontractor
compensation clauses can survive strict scrutiny, and
any relevance distinctions such as these may have to
that question, should be addressed in the first instance
by the lower courts.
  Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

                                      It is so ordered.